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Security Information

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See comment

Official Diary

Wednesday, 5 November 1952

1. Indicated to DCI my comments on the FBI letter on NSCID No. 9 and he concurred<sup>7</sup> in my recommendations. Later discussed these with General Magruder and Park Armstrong, <sup>AD/C</sup> both of whom also agreed. Mr. Lay later indicated that he would call a meeting on this in the near future and would invite Mr. Sheldon.

2. Raised with DCI the request by Spingarn, Acting FTC Chairman, for foreign reaction to the FTC report. DCI recommended "no," unless the request was received from NSC. Later informed Spingarn of this decision and phoned Jimmy Lay to the same effect. Lay raised some question as to how FTC, an independent Agency not sitting on NSC, would be able to do this, but we felt this was Spingarn's problem. Also informed Mr. Lay on my views on the FBI comment on NSCID No. 9.

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3. Chatted with [REDACTED] and discovered that he was available to come to CIA, if we desired him. I indicated that I would get in touch with him later, and indicated his availability to DCI. No decision was reached.

4. Briefed DCI on the State/Defense dispute on Iranian policy and its impact on our forthcoming Iranian estimate. Expressed my own view as being somewhat closer to that of the Embassy's and [REDACTED] than the coordinated estimators' <sup>25X1A9a</sup> view.

5. On discussing my trip, DCI indicated that I should take someone with me, and I indicated [REDACTED] of O/CI, who could continue his intelligence survey of the intelligence needs of the covert offices. <sup>25X1A9a</sup>

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6. With Mr. Sheldon and [REDACTED], called on Vannever Bush as to NSA Research Director. Dr. Bush commented on a list which we presented him, but made the observation that most of these men were most difficult to obtain, since they had forged well ahead during the war. It would be more desirable if we could obtain a relatively unknown man, of about 40, who had maximum potential, who would be interested in the problem, and who tended to be an introvert. All of us thought this advice was excellent and planned to consult members of the SCAG group and any others available on this point.

7. Discussed with General Magruder and Park Armstrong the following:

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- a. I proposed revision of paragraph 1 e (2) of the Directive so as to have "subject to NSCID No. 5" at the beginning of the clause. I was assured by both Magruder and Armstrong that they did not interpret the clause as covering other than formal intergovernmental arrangements, as distinguished from espionage activities. I recognized that this was a legitimate interpretation and agreed not to press the request for amendment.
- b. General Magruder had a minor clerical error to be corrected, but we agreed that it was best that it should be noted by Lay so that it could be corrected in a later Directive.

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- c. I outlined to Armstrong and Magruder our concern as to how our new NSA Staff might operate and they agreed. Magruder is to be Defense representative on the Board. I later suggested to Mr. Armstrong, and they recommend, that I go on the Board as CIA representative, with Mr. Sheldon as alternate. Able

8. Some question was raised as to who could represent CIA on the COMSEC Board, and I indicated that this would almost certainly be [REDACTED]

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9. [REDACTED]

10. Admiral Wenger phoned, General Canine having been unable to reach me. He indicated that Canine had mentioned to the Director the desirability of keeping [REDACTED] as NSA Staff Chairman. I explained to Wenger our new concept of the staff and indicated that a fairly senior representative would have to chair or head up the staff group. [REDACTED] would be entirely satisfactory for the executive secretarial function. Wenger was satisfied. Able

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11. Wenger also, on Canine's behalf, requested that our administrative people consult with NSA representatives so that the latter could reorganize their budgeting and other administration. I suggested that they apply to [REDACTED] and spoke to Col. White in [REDACTED] absence. DD/A will carry on on this. I indicated that they could consult Sheldon as to any questions on functions of NSA. 25X1A9a

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AD/RR, Acting

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12. Discussed with [REDACTED] FE, problems arising from both O/RR and FE's desire to hire [REDACTED], and decided that we would let [REDACTED] be the judge as to where he would be most effective in the Agency. Also discussed, at length, measures to increase the effectiveness of collection of economic intelligence on China. [REDACTED] He was very receptive to the idea of an O/RR analyst being permanently [REDACTED]

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13. [REDACTED] gave a brief report on what O/NE was doing to prepare revisions for NIE-75 to take cognizance of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] views on a third possibility as to the manner in which Iranian affairs might deteriorate. 25X1A9a  
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14. Convinced Mr. Dulles that he should attend the IAC meeting on 6 November. [REDACTED] gave him a special briefing today.

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15. Conferred with Messrs. [REDACTED] Sheldon, [REDACTED] on the approach to be taken with Admiral Wenger in order to improve operations at AFSA. It was agreed that CIA would present only its minimum demands, including fixing of selected persons in key positions in appropriate offices and stating certain procedural objectives. Meanwhile

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5X1A9a 25X1A9a Mr. Sheldon and [REDACTED] would continue to pursue contacts recently made with Messrs. [REDACTED] with the idea that the first mission to be assigned to such individual might be to act as an impartial arbitrator in settling this long-standing dispute. Mr. Sheldon expressed the opinion that [REDACTED] would make an ideal ultimate deputy for the appropriate office.

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16. Conferred with Mr. Sheldon and [REDACTED] on the general question of intelligence support of intelligence units to be assigned to Senior Representatives abroad. DD/I initialed O/CI memorandum for the record, dated 5 November, as an indication of his general approval. The question of the [REDACTED] was raised because it might require settlement before DD/I's return. DD/I approved the general program, provided that the chain-of-command issue was satisfactorily settled, and directed that AD/CI liaison directly with DD/P offices. 25X1A6a

17.. AD/CI delivered a paper recommending certain officers of three-star or higher rank who could well be considered for Director, NSA. DD/I pointed out that this appointment was an agreed special prerogative of Sec/Def but that Sec/Def might confer with DCI. [REDACTED] undertook to prepare a brief covering memorandum for DCI explaining why this analysis be available for his information. 25X1A9a

18. General McClellan and [REDACTED] conferred with DD/I on communications problems that might be encountered on the trip for DD/I.

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19. Passed on tip from Mr. Sheldon that [REDACTED] had learned from Admiral Wenger that AFSA or the NSA was seriously considering asking CIA to step up its facilities by another hundred positions, alleging that in time of war it would become increasingly apparent that services could not recruit and train; a reenlistment rate of only 6% was cited. General McClelland and DD/I agreed that this was the type of work that CIA should undertake and that it would be in the best interest of the Agency in peacetime, and especially in the event of war, to have a larger program developed in this field.

20. At approximately 1615, the DD/I departed for an approximately 7-weeks trip, stopping to confer with [REDACTED] on the way.

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